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The Impact of New Zealand’s Statutory-Backed Continuous Disclosure Regime on 
Corporate Disclosure Behaviour 
Professional Summary 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange’s (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules have operated 
with statutory backing since 1 December 2002. Under the new continuous disclosure regime, 
an NZX-listed issuer is required to immediately release any material information once 
becoming aware of it. While the NZX takes the primary responsibility for monitoring its own 
listing rules, the statutory sanctions provide an enforcement regime to be implemented by 
either the Securities Commission with its prosecutory role, or any other person with an 
interest in any contravention of the statutory sanctions. If the statutory sanctions are effective, 
a better informed market – a market in which all material information must be released on a 
timely basis should be observed, which ultimately enhances investor protection. To test the 
effectiveness of the new continuous disclosure regime on the quantity, quality, and timeliness 
of public disclosures, we compare the changes in quantity (frequency), quality (precision and 
accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) of management earnings forecasts provided in company 
documents lodged with the NZX before and after the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
We select the eight-year period from financial report period ending on 31 January 1999 to 
financial report period ending on 31 December 2005 as our study period, which covers 
roughly four and a half years pre-statutory sanctions and three and a half years post-statutory 
sanctions. Across this study period, we identify 720 management earnings forecasts in the 
2677 documents related to 632 firm years released by 94 NZX-listed firms. The earnings 
forecast data extracted from the documents are then examined for changes in the quantity 
(frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) using both univariate 
and multivariate statistical procedures. The multivariate procedures control for time-series 
dependency and firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm performance, firm size, cross-listing 
status, and growth prospects) known to impact the disclosure decision in the absence of 
regulatory change. 
Our results provide qualified support for the effectiveness of statutory sanctions. Overall, 
disclosure frequency and the frequency of non-routine disclosures have significantly 
increased. However, a large number of material changes in periodic earnings are either not 
pre-empted by an earnings forecast or are only pre-empted by an earnings forecast made in 
conjunction with a routine announcement. Our results are also mixed for disclosure quality. 
While forecast precision and forecast accuracy have significantly improved, the improvement 
has come at the expense of a decline in forecast horizon. Furthermore, approximately 45 
percent of all earnings forecasts are still qualitative in nature. These results suggest that the 
impact of the statutory sanctions has fallen short of the continuous disclosure culture 
envisaged by New Zealand corporate regulators. Nevertheless, the positive change in 
managers’ forecasting behaviour is superior to that observed in other jurisdictions despite the 
lack of strong enforcement action. These findings have important implications for corporate 
regulators in their search for a superior corporate disclosure regime. 
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 The Impact of New Zealand’s Statutory-Backed Continuous Disclosure Regime on 
Corporate Disclosure Behaviour 
Abstract 
Since 1 December 2002, the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s (NZX) continuous disclosure 
listing rules have operated with statutory backing. To test the effectiveness of the new 
corporate disclosure regime, we compare the change in quantity (frequency), quality 
(precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) of earnings guidance in NZX disclosures 
before and after the introduction of statutory backing. Our results provide qualified support 
for the effectiveness of statutory sanctions. Disclosure frequency has significantly improved; 
however, a large number of material changes in periodic earnings are either not pre-empted by 
an earnings forecast or are only pre-empted by an earnings forecast made in conjunction with 
a routine announcement. In the post-statutory sanctions period, disclosure quality significantly 
improves in terms of forecast precision and accuracy but at the expense of a decline in 
forecast horizon, and many forecasts remain qualitative in nature. While these results suggest 
that the impact of regulatory reforms falls short of the continuous disclosure culture envisaged 
by New Zealand corporate regulators, the observed positive changes in managers’ forecasting 
behaviour have been achieved in the absence of strong enforcement action. These findings 
have important implications for corporate regulators in their search for a superior corporate 
disclosure regime. 
Keywords: continuous disclosure, management earnings forecasts, corporate regulation, 
statutory sanctions 
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 1. Introduction  
Corporate regulation has long been controversial. However, with the increasingly integrated 
global economy and the upsurge in corporate scandals over the last decade, there is renewed 
interest in the identification and implementation of best-practice regulatory frameworks 
(Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003; Gallery, 2006). Corporate governance and disclosure rules have 
been a priority in many regulatory reform programs that have been implemented across 
jurisdictions (Coglianese, Healy, Keating, and Michael, 2004; Ferrell, 2004). In New Zealand, 
a major regulatory reform occurred with an amendment to the Securities Markets Act 1988 
(SMA). From 1 December 2002 this amendment introduced statutory sanctions to support the 
NZX’s1 continuous disclosure (CD) listing rules. As there is little evidence on the 
effectiveness of such mandatory disclosure regimes2, this study seeks to examine the impact 
of statutory sanctions on the nature of public disclosures by NZX-listed companies. 
Broadly, the benefits obtained from corporate disclosure regulation relate to how successful 
the regulatory regime meets two complementary objectives: (1) ensuring that investors have 
sufficient timely information to make informed decisions, and (2) preventing unfair access to 
information and insider trading. Internationally, these objectives are jointly addressed through 
periodic and continuous reporting. 
Periodic financial reporting has the advantage of being structured and heavily regulated, but 
the information reported can be stale by the time it reaches investors. Continuous reporting 
can address the staleness issue but it is hard to regulate because it is difficult to establish when 
company insiders possess material information that should be released to investors. As a 
consequence, alternative regulatory approaches are evident across jurisdictions3. For example, 
securities regulation in the U.S. require SEC filing of quarterly financial reports and details 
about certain events (Form 8-K statements) within four business days after the event has 
occurred4. In contrast, Australian, U.K. and now New Zealand securities regulations require 
half-yearly reporting and the continuous disclosure of price-sensitive information. In contrast 
                                                 
1 The New Zealand Exchange Limited, which was formerly referred to as NZSE prior to 30 May 2003, is now 
referred to as NZX.  
2 For the studies that examined the CD Regime in Australia in various contexts, refer to Brown, Taylor, and 
Walter (1999), Gallery, Gallery, and Gilchrist (2002), and Chan, Faff, Ho, and Ramsay (2007). 
3 See Golding and Kalfus (2004) for an international comparison of disclosure regimes in the U.S., U.K., 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
4 In 2001 the SEC Chairman raised the possibility of a statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime to address 
disclosure issues arising from the Enron and other corporate scandals. However to date, only the scope of the 
Form 8-K disclosure obligations has been extended (Golding and Kalfus, 2004). 
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 to the prescriptive U.S. approach, the principles-based CD approach provides managers with 
considerable disclosure discretion in the lengthy time period between periodic reports. 
The New Zealand setting provides an ideal environment to examine the effectiveness of a 
statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime for a number of reasons. First, the regime was 
introduced only recently; hence, the formulation of the rules, and the accompanying 
provisions and guidance have benefited from the experiences in other jurisdictions (notably 
Australia) and coincided with the recent strengthening of corporate governance rules. Second, 
most related research focuses on the U.S. market where a strong culture of private 
enforcement of tort and securities laws tends to mask the impact of public enforcement. 
Moreover, recent U.S. research has focused on the effectiveness on rules designed to prevent 
selective disclosure (Regulation FD) rather than on continuous disclosure. Therefore, the U.S. 
research is of limited usefulness in informing debates about the effectiveness of continuous 
disclosure regimes. Third, while the New Zealand CD rules are very similar to those adopted 
in Australia, the New Zealand regulatory environment is significantly different. New Zealand 
has relatively light handed regulation and has a less litigious business environment. Indeed, 
there is little evidence of active enforcement of the New Zealand statutory-backed CD 
regime5 compared to the recent trends in Australia6. Fourth, from a research design 
perspective, a reliable data source exists to effectively test the impact of statutory sanctions 
because disclosure documents lodged with the NZX are available in electronic form for a 
number of years prior to and subsequent to the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
To evaluate the effect of statutory sanctions on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of public 
disclosures, we examine changes in management earnings forecasts7 provided in company 
documents lodged with the NZX before and after the regulatory change. Researchers have 
tested the effectiveness of changes in disclosure regimes using a number of alternative 
measures such as changes in disclosure indices, stock price volatility, bid-ask spreads, analyst 
earnings forecasts, and management earnings forecasts. Of these measures, management 
                                                 
5 The Fletcher Forests, Feltex, and Wool Equities cases are examples where alleged breaches of CD obligations 
did not lead to actual prosecutions (New Zealand Press Association, 2003; Macfie, 2006; Ward, 2007a, 2007b). 
6 In Australia, the recent Southcorp and Aristocat Leisure cases are important examples showing potential 
success of the civil penalty proceedings and class action against companies contravening the CD obligations 
(Golding and Kalfus, 2004). 
7 Consistent with King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990, p.113), we define management earnings forecasts to 
include all “managerial disclosures predicting earnings prior to the expected reporting date”. 
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 earnings forecasts8 have a number of desirable properties relative to alternative measures for 
testing the effectiveness of New Zealand CD regime. First, unlike one-off price-sensitive 
events (such as merger proposals), management earnings forecasts are generally applicable to 
all firms and can be readily evaluated ex post through periodic financial reports. Second, the 
NZX specifically requires the disclosure of a change in a listed entity’s financial forecast or 
expectation under the CD rules. As a consequence, it is difficult for a company to rely on the 
carve-out provisions to avoid disclosure when an earnings change is probable. Third, 
compared with other price-sensitive issues, managers have considerable discretion over the 
timing, frequency, form, and precision of their earnings forecasts. The “well-defined” features 
which encompass both disclosure quantity and quality make them an empirically superior 
disclosure proxy in corporate disclosure research (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). 
We identify 720 earnings forecasts in the 2677 documents released by 94 NZX-listed firms 
across the full study period (including 632 firm years with ending balance date from 31 
January 1999 to 31 December 2005). The earnings forecast data extracted from the documents 
are then examined for changes in the quantity (frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), 
and timeliness (horizon) using both univariate and multivariate statistical procedures. The 
multivariate procedures control for time-series dependency and firm-specific characteristics 
(i.e. firm performance, firm size, cross-listing status, and growth prospects) known to impact 
the disclosure decision in the absence of regulatory change. 
Our results provide qualified support for the effectiveness of statutory sanctions. Overall, 
disclosure frequency and frequency of disclosures other than as part of routine 
communications such as mandatory periodic financial reports and periodic releases associated 
with repetitive events (i.e. non-routine disclosures) have significantly increased; however, a 
large number of material changes in periodic earnings are not pre-empted by a least one 
management earnings forecast and many earnings forecasts continue to be issued in 
conjunction with routine information releases. Our results are also mixed for disclosure 
quality: forecast precision and forecast accuracy have significantly improved; however, the 
improvement has been accompanied by a decline in timeliness for firms expecting positive 
earnings changes. Also, approximately 45 percent of all forecasts are still qualitative in 
nature. These results suggest that the introduction of statutory sanctions have not produced the 
                                                 
8 Refer to Cameron (1986), King et al. (1990), and Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) for reviews of  the 
management earnings forecast literature. 
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 continuous disclosure culture envisaged by New Zealand corporate regulators. Nevertheless, 
the positive change in managers’ forecasting behaviour is superior to that observed in other 
jurisdictions despite the lack of evidence of strong enforcement. This suggests that strong 
enforcement action is not necessarily a precondition for achieving a change in corporate 
disclosure behaviour as argued in prior research. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of New 
Zealand continuous disclosure regime. Section 3 summarises relevant disclosure theories and 
describes the research hypotheses. Section 4 provides an overview of the research design. 
Section 5 presents the results and the paper concludes in Section 6.  
2. Background to the New Zealand Continuous Disclosure Regime 
2.1 The Former Continuous Disclosure Regime 
Prior to 1 December 2002, New Zealand securities law only required issuers to provide 
periodic disclosures (the filing of annual reports), episodic disclosures (e.g. the disclosure of 
share dealings by directors), and IPO related disclosures (Erlenwein, 2003). Listed issuers9 
were also bound by continuous disclosure obligations under the NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1. 
Under this Rule, listed issuers had a general obligation to disclose all price-sensitive 
information (relevant information) once the maintenance of confidentiality ceased to have a 
greater value to the issuer concerned than to the public. Like most stock exchanges 
requirements, the NZX listing rules are purely contractual provisions that issuers accept upon 
listing. Like other listing rules, the NZX had responsibility for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with Rule 10.1.1.  The purely contractual nature of the disclosure obligation led to 
concerns about the effectiveness of Rule 10.1.110. Specifically, the NZX’s enforcement 
mechanisms were considered inadequate, the definition of relevant information was vague, 
uncertain and broad, and the rules were inconsistent with international standards (Erlenwein, 
2003). 
                                                 
9 Collectively, all listed entities (companies and trusts) are referred to as listed issuers under the NZX Listing 
Rules. 
10 Erlenwein (2003) notes that the powers of the NZX (formerly the NZSE) were examined by the Court of 
Appeal in New Zealand Stock Exchange Listed Company Association Inc. (1984) 1 NZLR 699, where it was 
held that the NZSE was neither empowered nor required to make statutory rules for listed companies. Thus, the 
NZSE can vary its rules arbitrarily and it also has the power to interpret its listing rules and make rulings 
regarding the application of the rules. Furthermore, the NZSE’s contractual agreement with listed companies did 
not provide a role for the Securities Commission in ensuring enforcement.  
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 2.3 The New Continuous Disclosure Regime 
The new CD regime applied from 1 December 2002 under the amended Securities Markets 
Act 1988 (SMA). Resembling the Australian model11, it was based on the principle that a 
strong (statutory-backed) continuous disclosure regime would deliver superior outcomes to a 
more onerous rules-based model and as a result, avoid the necessity for costly quarterly 
reporting12. Like the Australian regulatory arrangement, the SMA does not prescribe the CD 
regime applying to listed issuers; rather, it provides a statutory framework within which the 
NZX Listing  Rule 10.1 operates. The SMA requires a listed issuer (a party to a listing 
agreement with a registered exchange) to make any material information about events or 
matters available to participants in the registered exchange’s market as they arise (SMA, 
Section 19D). Thus, the SMA preserves the autonomy of the NZX through recognising its 
primary responsibility for monitoring its own listing rules. It has also provided an 
enforcement regime to be implemented by either the Securities Commission, with its 
prosecutory role, or any other person with an interest in any failure to disclose. The SMA 
emphasises investor protection through an informed market – a market in which “material 
information” must be released on a timely basis. According to Section 19E, material 
information is defined as information that: 
a reasonable person would expect, if it were generally available to the market, to 
have a material effect on the price or value of quoted securities of the public 
issuer13 
Coinciding with the introduction of the amended SMA, on 1 December 2002 the NZX 
introduced revised Listing Rule 10.1 to ensure compatibility with the SMA. The revised rule 
provides that an issuer should release material information immediately once becoming 
“aware” of it. A listed issuer is deemed to have come into possession of material information 
once a director or executive officer has become aware of it in the course of the performance of 
                                                 
11 The Australian continuous disclosure regime represents a combination of stock exchange rules and statutory 
enactments. Under ASX Listing Rule 3.1, an entity has an immediate disclosure obligation when it becomes 
aware of any information that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of 
its securities. The ASX continuous disclosure requirements have been backed by statutory sanctions since 5 
September 1994. A failure to comply the continuous disclosure obligations could lead to civil and criminal 
penalties.  
12 A majority of participants in the New Zealand Securities Commission’s consultation process regarding to 
corporate governance rejected the proposition of mandatory quarterly reporting for three reasons: (1) the 
continuous disclosure regime is sufficient, (2) unnecessary compliance costs, and (3) the risk of entities 
managing short-term earnings (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.57). 
13 Erlenwein (2003) and McGill (2004) question the vagueness of the terms “reasonable person” and “material 
information” as defined in the SMA. 
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 his or her duties (Listing Rule 10.1.1). To assist companies in identifying material 
information, guidance notes to the listing rule provide a non-exhaustive list of events. The 
first and most relevant to our study is “a change in the issuer’s financial forecast or 
expectation”14. 
The NZX has recognised that there are situations where the issuer should legally be allowed 
to withhold material information. Although not incorporated into the SMA, the “carve-out” 
provisions are a vital part of the continuous disclosure regime. According to the provisions, 
material information does not have to be released when: (1) a reasonable person would not 
expect the information to be disclosed; and, (2) the information is confidential and its 
confidentiality is maintained; and, (3) it would either be illegal to release the information, or it 
contains an incomplete proposal or negotiation, or comprises matters or supposition, or is 
insufficiently definite, or is for internal management only, or is a trade secret. Even if all three 
criteria are met, a firm can still be required to release specific information if it is necessary to 
prevent the development of a false market in a firm’s securities15. 
If an issuer is found to have breached the CD provisions, the Securities Commission has the 
power under the amended SMA 1988 to issue an order requiring the issuer to disclose the 
necessary information and to publish corrective statements at the firm’s expense. If the issuer 
commits a criminal offence in contravention of an order, a fine of up to $30,000 can be 
imposed. The Court may also make civil orders requiring disclosure or corrective statements, 
impose pecuniary penalties of up to $300,000, make compensatory orders, and order the 
payment of the Securities Commission’s costs and expenses. 
In many aspects, the disclosure regime introduced through the SMA resembles the recent 
Australian disclosure model16. While harmonising rules across jurisdictions can reduce costs 
for cross-listed firms, it has been argued that costs have increased disproportionately for other 
NZX-listed companies17. It is also not clear whether a statutory model is more effective than 
                                                 
14 This change may arise not just from a revised expectation with respect to a projection or forecast in a prior 
announcement to the NZX but also from a change in the issuer’s expected financial results relative to those for 
the previous corresponding period (See Example 7 of NZX Guidance Note - Continuous Disclosure, p.14). 
15 A false market is “a market for quoted securities which is materially influenced by false or misleading 
information” (NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1 (c)). 
16 The level of enforcement of Australian continuous disclosure regime has significantly increased in the post-
2000 period (ASIC Consultation Paper 5: Heard it on the grapevine, 1999; ASIC Launches National Continuous 
Disclosure Surveillance Program, 2000; The CLERP Audit Reform and Disclosure Act 2004). 
17 See Erlenwein (2003), Gaynor (2003), McGill (2004), and Fargher (2004) for critiques of the new continuous 
disclosure rules. Also see Meade (2006) for the comparison of the New Zealand CD regime with the Australian 
CD regime, and the U.S. Regulation FD regime. 
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 alternatives, such as the more prescriptive U.S. approach, in changing corporate disclosure 
behaviour. Whether there is an improvement in timely information flows depends on whether 
managers perceive the increased costs of withholding information outweigh the expected 
benefits. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 The Disclosure Decision 
The disclosure literature suggests a number of reasons why management may be willing or 
reluctant to publicly disclose information. The adverse selection hypothesis suggests that 
managers choose to disclose or withhold information depending on a trade-off between the 
associated proprietary costs and expected benefits of informing investors (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988). From a signalling perspective, managers may disclose 
negative information to deter entry of competitors to the product markets (Dye, 1986; 
Wagenhofer, 1990) or signal the superior quality of their firms (Akerlof, 1970; Teoh and 
Hwang, 1991). Managers may wish to signal the perceived inaccuracies in the market 
estimates of the firm’s prospects (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) and reduce the private information 
acquisition costs to investors (King et al., 1990). Alignment of the market’s expectations may 
also be a desirable objective to mitigate potential litigation costs (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Cao 
and Narayanamoorthy, 2006) or reputation impairment costs (Skinner, 1994; Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Tucker, 2006) arising from earnings surprises. Voluntary 
disclosure of earnings forecasts and other information could be used to minimise cost of 
capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Graham 
et al., 2005). However, managers might also opportunistically utilise disclosure to maximize 
their compensation (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). 
Collectively, the voluntary disclosure research suggests that managers balance conflicting 
interests in deciding to disclose or withhold information. Ultimately the decision to disclose is 
strategically driven and influenced by the nature of the information held by managers, 
incentives of managers, circumstances of the firm, and expected reaction by investors to the 
disclosure18. Intervention in the form of mandatory disclosure rules increases costs for non-
compliance and leads managers to reassess their disclosure strategies. Research shows that the 
nature of the rule change and legal system contribute to observed variation in disclosure 
                                                 
18 Refer to Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the disclosure literature.  
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 behaviour across regimes. For instance, the strong culture of private litigation in the U.S. 
appears to precipitate the early disclosure of bad news relative to good news (Skinner, 1994; 
Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 2000; Baginski, Hassell, and 
Kimbrough, 2002). A similar level of asymmetrical treatment of news in not observed in 
Canada or in Japan where litigation risk is low (Baginski et al., 2002; Kato, Skinner, and 
Kunimura, 2006). 
3.2 The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Frequency of Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
In the absence of research on the earnings forecasting behaviour of NZX-listed firms19, it is 
difficult to predict how statutory sanctions affected the public earnings guidance by NZX-
listed firms20.  A priori we would expect any change in disclosure practices arising from the 
introduction of statutory sanctions would be similar to those observed in Australia following 
the introduction of their statutory CD disclosure regime in 1994. The Australian findings are 
generally supportive of an overall increase in the frequency of public disclosures. 
In an early study examining the capital market impact of the Australian statutory-backed CD 
regime, Brown et al. (1999) reveal that there is an increase in the frequency of price-sensitive 
disclosures made by the ASX-listed firms following the introduction of statutory sanctions.  
However, the increase is confined to relatively small firms and for firms which are more 
likely to reveal bad news. However, their study only examines a relatively short period around 
the 1994 introduction date (from August 1992 to March 1996) in which the enforcement 
action is considered to be weak21.  
In a more recent study, Chan et al. (2007) investigate the extent and nature of management 
earnings forecasts for a large sample of analyst followed companies listed on the ASX for the 
period 1994 to 2001. Their results show that the increased enforcement action by the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the effects of legislative changes to the 
                                                 
19 Prior NZ disclosure research only focus on voluntary disclosure in interim or annual reports (Bradbury, 1992; 
Hossain, Perera, and Rahman, 1995; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Wong and Wong, 2006). 
20 Other NZ studies on the effectiveness of the regime examine a number of alternative measures including bid-
ask spreads, stock liquidity, market spreads, analysts’ consensus forecast and dispersion, stock market reaction to 
earnings announcements (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad, and Wisniewski, 2005; Marsden, Huang, and Poskitt, 2006; 
Poskitt and Yang, 2006). 
21 There is little evidence that compliance with the CD regime was effectively enforced by either regulatory 
authorities or shareholders until the Southcorp case in 2003 (Golding and Kalfus, 2004). 
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 Australian CD regime have significantly increased the level of non-routine earnings forecasts 
in the period after 1 January 200022.  
Assuming that the New Zealand regulation has had a similar impact, we would expect to see 
an increase in the quantity of management earnings forecasts released following the 
introduction of New Zealand statutory sanctions in 2002. That is, when managers become 
aware of material changes in expected earnings, they are more likely to release earnings 
guidance (on one or more occasions) to the market following the introduction of statutory 
sanctions. Consistent with the findings of Chan et al. (2007), we expect that the disclosure 
increase to be dominated by an increase in non-routine disclosures in the post-statutory 
sanctions period. Accordingly, we test the following hypotheses: 
H1a: The frequency of management earnings forecasts in NZX announcements 
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
H1b: The frequency of non-routine management earnings forecasts in NZX 
announcements increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions 
3.3 The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Quality of Management Earnings Forecasts 
Following the decision to release information to the market, managers must then decide on 
the qualitative characteristics of the information they are reporting (King et al., 1990). The 
qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts have been of recent interest to 
empirical researchers (Hirst et al., 2008). These studies examine a number of qualitative 
characteristics of earnings forecasts including precision and accuracy. However, the findings 
from these studies are mixed.  
Skinner (1994) categories management earnings forecasts for a small sample of U.S. firms 
according to decreasing levels of precision (point, range, lower bound, upper bound, and 
qualitative forecasts) and finds that good news earnings forecasts tend to be point or range 
estimates while bad news forecasts tend to be qualitative. Bamber and Cheon (1998) report 
similar findings. They argue that managers faced with a higher probability of being sued for 
releasing inaccurate forecasts are likely to issue more qualitative earnings forecasts since 
qualitative forecasts are less likely to be inaccurate, leading to lower probability of being 
                                                 
22 In the period immediately following the introduction of statutory sanctions in Australia, Gallery et al. (2002) 
observe that most earnings forecasts clustered around announcements provided in conjunction with a routine 
event such as the Chairman’s Address or the release of a periodic report. 
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 prosecuted. Baginski et al. (2002) find that in the Canadian market, which exacts lower legal 
penalties for inaccuracy than does the U.S. system, managers are likely to issue more precise 
forecasts that are less dependent on firm performance. Similarly, Frost (2004) documents that 
U.S. and U.K. managers issue fewer specific earnings forecasts and forecasts with shorter 
horizons compared to managers in France, Germany and Japan. Japanese managers 
consistently issue over-optimistic forecasts when releasing current period results, especially 
when firm performance is poor. These forecasts are, however, systematically corrected as the 
forecast horizon declines (Kato et al., 2006; Ota, 2006). 
The Australian evidence is also mixed. Based on a sample of 233 stand-alone23 earnings 
forecasts made by Australian firms, Coulton and Taylor (2004) show that good news stand-
alone earnings forecasts are significantly more precise than bad news disclosures. However, 
using a much larger sample and including earnings forecasts in some routine documents such 
as the preliminary final and interim reports, Chan et al. (2007) find no association between 
forecast precision and earnings news. Chan's et al. findings suggest that the Australian CD 
regime does not discriminate between good and bad news. All material changes, regardless of 
the direction of the news, are considered price sensitive. Based on the findings of Chan et al., 
we also expect to observe an increase in quality of forecasts following the regime change in 
NZ. Hence we hypothesize that:  
H2: The quality (precision and accuracy) of management earnings forecasts in 
NZX announcements increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
3.3 The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Timeliness of Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
Justification for a statutory-backed CD regime is based on a belief that stronger enforcement 
will create a better informed market because the market will be continuously updated with 
material information. The disclosed information increases in usefulness to decision makers if 
it provides a timely indicator of future performance, irrespective of the direction of earnings 
news (i.e. good or bad future performance). Although the New Zealand legal system imposes 
lower legal penalties through weaker private enforcement than either the U.S. or Australian 
systems, we expect the threat of increasing public enforcement through statutory sanctions 
                                                 
23 Stand alone earnings forecasts are earnings forecasts which are not issued in conjunction with earnings 
announcements or with other major corporate announcements (e.g. major acquisition or disposal) (Coulton and 
Taylor, 2004; Hirst et al., 2008). 
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 will act as a disincentive for managers to delay the disclosure of price-sensitive information. 
This leads to the following hypothesis about the timeliness of management earnings forecasts: 
H3: The time horizon of management earnings forecasts in NZX announcements 
is longer following the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
The research on management earnings forecasts also highlights that forecast precision and 
accuracy need to be jointly examined with the forecast horizon. As more of the financial 
reporting period elapses and less time remains before the release of periodic reports, 
management will possess more information about the eventual outcome. Consistent with the 
expectation adjustment hypothesis, this greater certainty is frequently shown to lead to more 
precise (Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Baginski et al., 2002; Coulton and Taylor, 2004; 
Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2006; Chan et al., 2007) and more accurate (Kasznik, 
1999; Chen, 2004; Hribar and Yang, 2006) earnings forecasts. Thus, there is likely to be a 
trade-off between providing better quality forecasts and more timely forecasts.  We make no 
predictions about this trade-off, but allow for any interactions in our research design. 
3.4 Control Variables 
The research findings on the effectiveness of the Australian CD regime are generally 
consistent with the litigation cost hypothesis (Skinner, 1994, 1997). According to this 
hypothesis, management earnings forecasts are more likely to occur when there are large 
negative earnings surprises in high litigation cost environments. In support of this hypothesis, 
Baginski et al. (2002) reveal that Canadian managers who operate in a less litigious 
environment than their U.S. counterparts, release more forecasts when earnings are increasing 
while U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during periods when 
earnings are decreasing (i.e. during bad news periods). Likewise, we do not expect to see a 
bad news disclosure bias in the New Zealand low litigious environment24. Nevertheless, we 
seek to investigate this issue by controlling for the earnings direction and news.  
Our hypotheses have been developed to consider the impact of statutory sanctions on the 
quantity, quality, and timeliness of management earnings forecasts. In developing these 
hypotheses, we have assumed statutory sanctions will be effective in changing disclosure 
behaviour in favour of compliance as has occurred in Australia. However, institutional 
                                                 
24 Any asymmetrical treatment of positive or negative earnings expectations would also be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the CD regime.  
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 differences arising from the nature of the two markets, differences in the interpretations of the 
CD provisions, and differences in enforcement mechanisms may lead to variation in 
disclosure behaviour across the two jurisdictions25. For example, managers may not perceive 
the increased costs arising from being detected and penalised for non-compliance to be 
sufficiently large to outweigh the benefits gained from remaining with their existing 
disclosure strategies.  
The costs of non-compliance are likely to increase in the level of materiality of unannounced 
changes in earnings expectations. When investors and analysts are surprised by large earnings 
changes, managers face greater potential litigation and reputation impairment costs; therefore, 
the magnitude of the expected earnings change is likely to be an important factor influencing 
management disclosure decisions (Kasznik and Lev, 1995). These costs are likely to increase 
under a more onerous CD regime. Even though the threat of prosecution is low in New 
Zealand, such a threat will be more likely if the unexpected earnings changes are large26. 
Therefore, we control for the magnitude of earnings changes in testing the change in 
disclosure behaviour.  
Also, in developing our hypotheses, we have assumed that firm-specific factors are irrelevant 
to disclosure behaviour. Clearly, it is not the case. Prior research has shown that firm 
attributes such as firm size, cross-listing status, and growth prospects impact the disclosure 
decision regardless of the disclosure regime. Although these factors are expected to vary 
cross-sectionally among NZX-listed firms, they are not expected to directly lead to a change 
in disclosure behaviour subsequent to the introduction of statutory sanctions. To be confident 
that our findings are not influenced by these factors, we include appropriate controls in our 
research design.  
4. Research Design 
4.1 Study Period and Sample  
The eight-year period from financial report period ending on 31 January 1999 to financial 
report period ending on 31 December 2005 is selected for testing purpose. This study period 
                                                 
25 New Zealand has a comparatively smaller securities industry with lower volume and liquidity, there are 
differences in judicial interpretations arising from disclosure-based case law, and the type, size, and method of 
imposing penalties for non-disclosure vary across the two countries (Erlenwein, 2003; McGill, 2004). 
26 That is, it will be much easier for the corporate regulators or an aggrieved investor to argue a case of non-
compliance if a company is silent before a large earnings surprise. 
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 therefore covers roughly four and a half years prior to the introduction of statutory sanctions 
on 1 December 2002 and three and a half years post-statutory sanctions. All NZX-listed 
companies that survive at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004 
are included in the sample27. This selection process identifies 94 companies and they issue 
2677 usable documents in announcements to the NZX. These documents contain 720 usable 
earnings forecasts28. Details of the sample selection procedure are provided in Table 1. 
4.2 Data Sources and Classification of Management Earnings Forecasts 
The NZX listing status is extracted from the Company Information section of the IRG 
database. The cross-listing status and listing date information are taken directly from NZX 
help line services. Earnings and other financial accounting information are obtained from the 
DataStream database or the Financial Information section of the IRG database. All disclosure 
data are extracted from announcements recorded in the Company Announcements section of 
the IRG database29. 
All the identified earnings forecasts are then scrutinised and coded according to the 
underlying event (routine or non-routine) associated with the announcements. Routine event 
announcements are defined as periodic announcements common to all firms required under 
NZX listing rules or are in common practice. They include all mandatory periodic financial 
reports (e.g. preliminary final, annual, half-yearly, quarterly reports), and other periodic 
releases associated with repetitive events (e.g. chairman’s addresses at the AGM, letters to 
shareholders). All other announcements are considered non-routine events. Earnings forecasts 
are further classified according to their content (bad, neutral, or good news), precision 
(qualitative, open-ended, range or point estimates), error, and horizon. 
Earnings forecasts are classified as good (bad) news if the content reveals favourable 
(unfavourable) earnings prospects relative to the last periodic earnings announcement or the 
last earnings forecast (if one had been provided since the last periodic earnings 
                                                 
27 In contrast, other Australian studies focus on only large firms, e.g. Gallery et al. (2002) sample the top 500 
ASX-listed companies, and Chan et al. (2007) sample only ASX-listed companies with analyst coverage.  
28 These documents include all routine announcements which potentially include earnings forecasts (e.g. 
preliminary final reports, annual reports, half-yearly reports, quarterly reports, chairman’s addresses at AGM, 
letters to shareholders, etc), and any non-routine announcement containing earnings forecasts provided during 
the study period. 
29 The Company Announcements section captures all company announcements release to the NZX under its 
listing rules, including the revised CD Listing Rule 10.1, applicable from 1 December 2002. 
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 announcement). Earnings forecasts are coded as neutral if the forecast indicates no expected 
change in earnings. 
Forecast precision is defined as the level of specificity in the management earnings forecast. 
We follow Baginski et al. (2002) and Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) by using an 
ordinal coding scheme where precision is coded 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, 
range and point estimates, respectively. Qualitative forecasts are those where management 
provides a general impression about the expected performance (e.g. “we expect improved 
earnings performance this year”). These qualitative forecasts do not capture any precise 
numeric interpretation about the firms’ expected performance. Open-ended forecasts are 
forecasts where management specifies a lower bound or an upper bound for the expected firm 
performance (e.g. “profit will be greater than $5 million” or “profit will be lower than $2 
million”). Range forecasts contain a precise numeric range of expected firm performance (e.g. 
“profit will be between $1.1 and $1.3 million”). Point forecasts are more specific, indicating a 
precise single numerical figure about expected performance (e.g. “net income will be $1.2 
million”). 
Forecast error measures the accuracy level of range and point earnings forecasts. We follow 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Baginski et al. (2006) and define forecast error as the magnitude of 
the difference between forecasted and actual earnings deflated by share price at the beginning 
of the financial year.  
In our study, forecast horizon captures the timeliness of the earnings forecast. Assuming 
forecasts are accurate, longer forecast horizon provides investors with information on a 
timelier basis. Baginski et al. (2002) define forecast horizon as the number of calendar days 
until period end, regardless of whether the period is an interim or annual forecasting period. 
We follow the similar procedure and based on the fact that most forecasts in New Zealand 
relate to current full period earnings, we measure forecast horizon as the number of calendar 
days between the release date of the earnings forecast and the end of the current financial 
year. 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
The hypotheses are tested using univariate methods, and due to the expected interactions 
across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test hypotheses and to control 
for common firm-specific factors expected to impact on the disclosure decisions. In most of 
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 the multivariate procedures, we estimate random effects logistic/linear regression models to 
make inferences about the hypothesised relationships and to control for the firm-specific 
attributes, heterogeneity bias and non-independence across observations30. The model 
specifications are as follows. 
FCAST1i,t = a0 + a1REGIMEi,t+ a2ECSIGNi,t+ a3ECHANGEi,t+ a4SIZEi,t+ 
a5XLISTi,t+ a6MVBVi,t + (ui + εi,t)      (1a) 
FCAST2i,t = b0 + b1REGIMEi,t+ b2ECSIGNi,t+ b3ECHANGEi,t+ b4SIZEi,t+ 
b5XLISTi,t+ b6MVBVi,t +  μi,t        (1b) 
PRECISE1i,t = c0 + c1REGIMEi,t+ c2BADi,t+ c3GOODi,t + c4ECHANGEi,t+ 
c5SIZEi,t+ c6XLISTi,t+ c7MVBVi,t + c8NREVENTi,t + c9FHORIZONi,t + ηi,t (2a) 
ERRORi,t = d0 + d1REGIMEi,t+ d2BADi,t+ d3GOODi,t + d4ECHANGEi,t+ 
d5SIZEi,t+ d6XLISTi,t+ d7MVBVi,t + d8PRECISE2i,t + d9FHORIZONi,t + γi,t (2b) 
FHORIZONi,t = e0 + e1REGIMEi,t+ e2BADi,t+ e3GOODi,t + e4ECHANGEi,t+ 
e5SIZEi,t+ e6XLISTi,t+ e7MVBVi,t + e8FNUMi,t + φi,t    (3) 
Equations (1a-b), (2a-b), and (3) are used to test for forecast frequency changes (H1a), non-
routine forecast frequency changes (H1b), forecast quality (precision and accuracy) changes 
(H2), and forecast horizon changes (H3).  The definitions of the dependent variables in the 
equations are as follows: 
FCAST1 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s change in 
earnings is pre-empted by at least one management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. 
FCAST2 is an ordinal variable taking the value of 2, 1, and 0 if the current financial year’s 
change in earnings in pre-empted by at least a non-routine earnings forecast, at least a routine 
earnings forecast, and no earnings forecasts, respectively. 
PRECISE1 is the level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-
ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. PRECISE2 takes the value of 0 and 1 for range 
and point earnings forecasts, respectively, in equation (2b). 
                                                 
30 Where the random effects model is proved not to have any significant improvement in the coefficient 
estimators, the results from a generic multivariate (logistic or OLS) regression model are reported. 
16 
 ERROR is the natural logarithm of the magnitude of the forecast error measured by the 
difference between forecasted and actual earnings deflated by share price at the beginning of 
the financial year. Only the last range and point forecasts for the period are used 31. 
FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of the last management 
earnings forecast in the period and the end date of the corresponding financial year. 
The independent variables in equations (1a-b), (2a-b), and (3) are defined as follows. 
REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period 
ends on or after 1 December 2002 and 0 otherwise. Significant positive coefficients for 
equations (1a-b), (2a), and (3) and significant negative coefficient for equation 2b for this 
variable will provide support for the hypothesised relationships. 
ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings 
per share change and 0 otherwise. 
BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast 
indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise (good or 
neutral forecasts). 
GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast 
indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise (bad or 
neutral forecasts). 
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per 
share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year.  
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting 
period32.  
XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign 
exchange and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
31 Consistent with Lev and Penman (1990), Rogers and Stocken (2005), Atiase, Li, Supattarakul, and Tse (2005), 
and Hirst et al. (2008), the ERROR model only focuses on the range and point earnings forecasts due to the more 
straightforward measure of forecast error.  
32 The market value of equity (MVE) is also used as a firm size proxy in sensitivity analysis, yielding similar 
findings to those reported for total assets. 
17 
 MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the current financial reporting period.  
NREVENT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast 
is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. 
FNUM is the number of earnings forecasts released per financial year. 
The three forecast characteristic variables PRECISE1 (PRECISE2), ERROR and FHORIZON 
have been shown to interact with each other (Baginski et al., 2002, 2006; Chan et al., 2007) 
are therefore are included as independent variables in the H2 and H3 regression tests. FNUM 
is also included as an independent variable in model 3 since a greater number of earnings 
forecasts released per year is likely to shorten the forecast horizon of the last forecast update. 
The independent variables ECSIGN, BAD, GOOD, ECHANGE, SIZE, and MVBV are those 
that have been commonly used in prior disclosure research (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 
1995; Baginski et al., 2002; Gallery et al., 2002; Baginski et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2007) and 
control for firm-specific factors that lead to differences in forecasting behaviour across firms 
independently of the disclosure regime. Consistent with Hossain et al. (1995), the XLIST 
variable is included because a number of NZX-listed companies are also listed on the ASX 
and other foreign exchanges where more onerous disclosure rules have existed prior to the 
introduction of statutory sanctions33. These disclosure rules and the associated litigation risk 
for non-compliance are likely to lead to fewer but higher quality earnings forecasts relative to 
non-cross-listed companies. As cross-listed companies are not expected to have changed their 
disclosure policies in the post-statutory sanctions period, this group of companies provides a 
natural control from which to compare the impact of the new rules on domestic companies. 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results 
Descriptive statistics and results of univariate testing procedures are provided in Tables 2 and 
3 and show statistics over the full study period and the pre- and post-statutory sanctions sub-
samples. Table 2 displays the number of financial years of the 94 sample firms pre-empted by 
earnings forecasts and extends the forecast disclosure analysis to the materiality of earnings 
                                                 
33 For example, the Australian CD rules have become increasingly more onerous since 1994, and the U.S. listing 
rules require quarterly financial reporting and the Form 8-K for certain events. 
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 changes. If statutory sanctions are effective, more material earnings changes should be pre-
empted with earnings forecasts34. The results are mixed. In the pre-statutory sanctions period, 
163 out of 342 (47.66%) firm years are pre-empted. In the post-statutory sanctions period, 
187 out of 290 (64.48%) firm years are pre-empted. Although consistent with an overall 
increase in the number of pre-emptions, the most significant increase is in the group above the 
5% and below the 10% materiality threshold. The 5 to 10% materiality threshold group for 
positive earnings changes experiences an increase in pre-emption from 50% to 88.24%, while 
the group above 10% materiality threshold for positive earnings changes shows an increase of 
only about 7% from 49.09% to 56.25%. The negative earnings changes group exhibits a 
similar but less obvious trend. Thus there are still a large number of material earnings changes 
not pre-empted by a forecast disclosure following the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the forecast and firm characteristics for all firm years 
(Panel A), for all management earnings forecasts (Panel B), and for all last range and point 
management earnings forecasts (Panel C). The parametric and non-parametric tests of the 
changes in the characteristics across the pre/post-statutory sanctions periods are also reported. 
Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in regression models. 
The summary statistics for firm-specific factors reveal considerable variation across sample 
firms which are typical of the nature of NZX-listed firms. However, the earnings change sign, 
the magnitude of earnings change, asset size, and cross-listing status, except for growth 
prospects (as measured by the market-to-book ratio) remain relatively stable and 
insignificantly different across the pre/post-statutory sanctions periods. 
For the forecast characteristics, Panel A shows that out of the sample of 632 firm years, 350 
firm years are pre-empted by at least one forecast (FCAST1)35. Of the 350 forecast firm years, 
103 (16.3%) firm years are pre-empted by at least one non-routine forecast (FCAST2). As 
expected, the significant increase in pre-emption is primarily driven by the increase in non-
routine forecasts (from 8.48% to 25.52%) rather than routine forecasts36. Additionally, 
untabulated results show that the average number of forecasts (FNUM) significantly increases 
for forecasting firms from a mean of 1.85 to 2.24 forecasts per year across the study periods. 
                                                 
34 Skinner (1994) finds that US firms increase their pre-emptions for both positive and negative earnings changes 
as the materiality of the earnings changes increases.  
35 Among 350 forecasting firm years, 131, 115, 69, 25, 8, and 8 firm years are pre-empted by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 
earnings forecasts, respectively. 
36 The number of firm years pre-empted by routine earnings forecasts remain stable around 39% of firm years 
across the study period. 
19 
 Panel B shows that out of the 720 earnings forecasts, 141 (19.58%) are associated with non-
routine events (NREVENT), 401 (55.69%) are qualitative (PRECISE1 = 0), 319 (44.31%) are 
quantitative (PRECISE1 = 1 to 3) (i.e. 71 open-ended, 68 range and 180 point estimates), 129 
(17.92%) are bad news forecasts (BAD), and the mean forecast horizon (FHORIZON) is 190 
days. Reflecting institutional differences, these forecast characteristics vary considerably from 
those reported in other studies. The proportion of non-routine earnings forecasts is far lower 
than the 34.9% reported in Chan et al. (2007) for analyst followed Australian firms. The 
percentage of quantitative forecasts is also far lower than that reported for Australian (92.2%), 
U.S (88.9%), and Canadian firms (89%) in Chan et al.'s (2007) and Baginski et al. (2002) 
respectively. Additionally, the frequency of bad news forecasts is much lower than prior 
studies. In Chan et al. (2007), 22.1% of Australian forecasts are bad news and in Baginski et 
al. (2002), 35.1% of U.S forecasts and 35.7% of Canadian forecasts are bad news. 
Consistent with Panel A, the Panel B results for the changes across the pre/post-statutory 
sanctions periods show a significant percentage change in the total earnings forecasts 
classified as non-routine (from 13.95% to 23.63%). Also evident is a significant decline in 
qualitative forecasts (from 70.1% to 45.35%) which is replaced by an increase in the three 
types of quantitative forecasts (from 7.97% to 11.22% for open-ended, from 3.65% to 13.6% 
for range, and from 18.27% to 29.83% for point forecasts). While these results are consistent 
with expected improvements in disclosure behaviour, contrary to expectation, the forecast 
horizon has declined (from a mean of 212 to 171 days for all earnings forecasts and from a 
mean of 132 to 126 days for the last pre-reporting date earnings forecasts) which suggests that 
managers are now slower at producing earnings forecasts and earnings forecast updates since 
the introduction of statutory sanctions37. 
In a continuous disclosure environment where firms provide multiple earnings forecasts 
during the reporting period, market participants and corporate regulators are likely to be most 
concerned about the accuracy and timeliness of the more quantitative forecasts prior to 
reporting date. Therefore, to further explore the changes in disclosure behaviour, Panel C 
provides statistics and test results for only the last pre-reporting date range and point earnings 
forecasts. The results for accuracy show a significant decline in the forecast error of range and 
point earnings forecasts (down from a mean of 0.219 to 0.017) across the two periods. 
Consistent with the results reported for forecast horizon in Panel B, the average forecast 
                                                 
37 Untabulated results also show a significant shift of the last forecast updates to the last quarter and the 
preannouncement period after the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
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 horizon of last forecast updates decline from 124 to 89 days. Given that we include the pre-
announcement period (period between the balance date and the reporting date) in our measure 
of forecast horizon, these results suggests that in the post-CD regime, the last forecast updates 
tend to lose considerable timeliness to investors. The other forecast characteristics are not 
significantly different in pre- and post-statutory sanctions periods. 
Taken together, the univariate results reported in Table 3 show that the introduction of 
statutory sanctions is associated with an improvement in forecast frequency, which is driven 
by an increase in non-routine forecasts, an improvement in forecast precision, and an 
improvement in forecast accuracy for the last range and point update prior to reporting date.  
However, contrary to the continuous disclosure principles, the introduction of statutory 
sanctions is associated with a decline in forecast horizon. Also, there remains a large number 
of periods with material earnings changes that are not pre-empted by earnings forecasts, and 
where forecasts are provided, a large number of these accompany routine events and lack 
specificity (i.e. take a qualitative form).  
5.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
The results from estimating the random effects logistic and linear regression models used to 
jointly test the hypothesised relationships are presented in Tables 4 to 838. All tables show the 
regression results for the full model inclusive of all observations. These are supplemented in 
each table with results for the negative/positive earnings changes or bad/good news sub-
samples to highlight any asymmetrical treatment which would be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the CD regime39. 
5.2.1 The Frequency of Management Earnings Forecasts (H1a) 
Table 4 reports the results for the FCAST1 logistic regression model. The binary FCAST1 
variable captures management’s decision to pre-empt or not to pre-empt an expected earnings 
change with forecast disclosures to the NZX. As expected, the REGIME coefficient is positive 
and significant (p-value = 0.000). Consistent with the descriptive statistics and univariate 
analysis reported earlier, the increase in disclosure frequency is driven by both firms facing 
                                                 
38 Random effects models are estimated to control for biases arising from the use of repeated observations across 
years. However, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test results support the use of linear regression models for 
the FHORIZON and ERROR models in Tables 7 and 8. 
39 Prior to estimating the multivariate models, bivariate correlations between independent variables were 
examined. However, none appear to be sufficiently large to suggest multicollinearity. 
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 negative and positive earnings changes (as indicated by the significant positive REGIME 
coefficient in both negative and positive earnings change models). Thus H1a is fully 
supported for both subsets of firms subject to either unfavourable or favourable earnings 
news40. 
Further evidence in Table 4 (main model) reveals the significant coefficients on the firm 
attribute controlled variables. These results are consistent with cross-sectional variation in the 
factors found to influence disclosure decisions in other disclosure regimes. The earnings 
change variable ECHANGE coefficient is significantly positive in the main model and in the 
positive earnings change model. This indicates that larger expected positive earnings changes 
are associated with more pre-emptive disclosures, which is consistent with the univariate 
results previously reported. The significantly positive SIZE coefficient also shows that larger 
firms are more likely to pre-empt earnings changes with forecast disclosures compared to 
smaller firms. The significantly negative XLIST coefficient is consistent with cross-listed 
firms providing fewer earnings forecasts than non-cross-listed firms to avoid potentially 
higher litigation costs in foreign jurisdictions if earnings forecasts subsequently prove to be 
inaccurate or misleading41. 
5.2.2 The Frequency of Non-routine Management Earnings Forecasts (H1b) 
Table 5 presents the regression results from estimating the multinominal logit model with 
FCAST2 as the dependent variable where FCAST2 takes the value of 2, 1, or 0 if the current 
financial year’s change in earnings is pre-empted by at least one non-routine earnings 
forecast, at least one routine earnings forecast, or no earnings forecast. The results show a 
significant negative REGIME coefficient variable for the 0/1 comparison (p = 0.015) and a 
significant positive coefficient for the 2/1 comparison (p = 0.000). Untabulated results also 
show a significant positive coefficient for the 2/0 comparison. Thus, these results indicate that 
in the post-sanctions period, firms are more likely to provide a forecast (routine and non-
routine) and are more likely to provide a non-routine forecast rather than a routine forecast42. 
                                                 
40 Similar results are obtained when we replace FCAST1 with FNUM (the number of earnings forecasts per 
financial year) in equation 1 and estimate a Tobit regression model. 
41 Also, quarterly reporting may contribute to the lower forecast frequency for cross-listed firms as untabulated 
results reveal a significant positive relationship between cross-listing status and the issuance of quarterly reports 
(Pearson chi-square = 67.447 and p-value = 0.000). 
42 Similar results are obtained from estimating an ordered logit instead of the multinominal logit regression 
model.   
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 In accordance with H1b, these results suggest that firms are now less likely to delay their 
forecasts until the occurrence of a routine event. These findings are consistent with those 
reported by Chan et al. (2007) that the level of non-routine earnings forecast disclosures 
issued by Australian listed companies significantly increases following the increased in ASIC 
enforcement action and legislative changes to the continuous disclosure regime in the post-
2000 period in Australia. 
Additionally, there is no evidence of asymmetrical treatment of expected earnings increases or 
decreases in the management decision to issue non-routine earnings forecasts. The results for 
the firm attribute control variables are generally similar to those reported for the FCAST1 
model. The significant negative SIZE coefficient for the 0/1 comparison shows that larger 
firms are more likely to pre-empt earnings changes with routine earnings forecasts compared 
to smaller firms. Also, a marginally significant positive SIZE coefficient for the 2/1 
comparison indicates that larger firms prefer to pre-empt earnings change with non-routine 
earnings forecasts compared to smaller firms. The highly positive significance of XLIST 
coefficient for the 0/1 comparison is consistent with cross-listed firms providing fewer routine 
earnings forecasts compared to non-cross-listed firms. 
5.2.3 The Quality of Management Earnings Forecasts (H2) 
Table 6 presents results obtained from estimating the forecast precision (PRECISE1) model 
using an ordered logit regression procedure. As predicted (H2), the results reveal a 
significantly positive REGIME coefficient (p = 0.000) indicating that forecast precision has 
improved across the regime periods. Also, the REGIME coefficient is consistently significant 
for both bad and good news earnings forecasts43. Our evidence is not consistent with Bamber 
and Cheon's (1998) proposition that increased litigation and regulatory activity will act as a 
disincentive for firms to issue more precise earnings forecasts. 
Further evident in Table 6 is the highly significant negative GOOD coefficient. Regardless of 
the regulatory period, this result indicates that good news forecasts are less precise than bad or 
neutral news forecasts. This asymmetrical treatment is consistent with the findings of Gallery 
et al. (2002) and Chan et al. (2007)  for Australian listed firms. As expected, larger firms 
facing bad news expectations are more likely to issue less precise forecasts and cross-listed 
                                                 
43 Similar results are obtained when we collapse the PRECISE1 categories into two categories: qualitative and 
quantitative (open-ended, range, and point) earnings forecasts and employ a random effects logit model. 
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 firms tend to make more precise forecasts44. Also, earnings forecasts accompanying non-
routine announcements and those with shorter horizons tend to be more precise. However, 
contrary to expectation, the significant positive MVBV coefficient suggests that firms with 
more growth prospects tend to provide more specific (quantitative) earnings forecasts. As the 
results are dominated by the good news sub-sample, a possible explanation is that firms 
facing positive growth prospects need to provide more precise earnings forecasts to convince 
the market of the informativeness and credibility of their forecast disclosures. 
Table 7 shows results from estimating the OLS regression model with ERROR as the 
dependent variable where ERROR captures the forecast deviation magnitude (a measure of 
forecast accuracy) of the last range and point earnings forecasts. As expected (H2), the results 
reveal a significantly negative REGIME coefficient (p = 0.003), indicating that forecast error 
has declined following regime change. However, as the results are primarily driven by good 
news sub-sample (and the untabulated neutral news sub-sample), H2 is only partially 
supported for this forecast error test. The other results are generally as expected. The 
ECHANGE coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the larger the expected 
earnings change, the larger the earnings forecast error; larger firms (SIZE) are more likely to 
have smaller forecast errors; and earnings forecasts associated with lower precision and 
shorter horizons tend to have smaller forecast errors45.  
5.2.4 The Timeliness of Management Earnings Forecasts (H3) 
Table 8 provides results from estimating the FHORIZON model. The FHORIZON variable 
captures the timeliness of only the last forecast update prior to reporting date. Statutory 
sanctions are predicted (H3) to lead to timelier disclosures. However, contrary to expectation, 
(but consistent with the univariate results reported in Table 3), the significant negative 
REGIME coefficient (p = 0.029) indicates a decline in the timeliness of forecast updates 
following regime change. Although contrary to continuous disclosure principles, the results 
                                                 
44 Baginski et al. (2002) argue that larger firms tend to provide less precise forecasts because they garner lower 
benefits relative to smaller firms from greater forecast specificity. Cross-listed firms are more likely to provide 
more precise forecasts, especially for firms cross-listed in the ASX because ASX CD Guidance discourages the 
release of qualitative earnings forecasts.  
45 We also examine forecast bias as measured by the signed forecast error and find no evidence of either positive 
or negative forecast bias in the pre- or post-statutory sanctions period. 
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 are consistent with the argument that a more litigious environment leads to managers issuing 
earnings forecasts with shorter horizons (Baginski et al., 2002)46. 
Other results shown in Table 8 reveal evidence of an asymmetric treatment of forecasts based 
on news type. The significantly negative BAD coefficient indicates that bad news tends to be 
timelier than good or neutral news and this has not changed across the pre/post statutory 
sanctions periods. However, for good news sub-sample, the negative REGIME coefficient 
suggests the decline in forecast horizon is mainly driven by this group. Additionally, the 
significantly negative SIZE coefficient suggests that large firms issue forecasts later, but (as 
shown in Table 4) these are more frequent. This is further supported by the significant and 
negative FNUM coefficient which shows that as the frequency of forecasts updates increases 
within periods, the forecast horizon declines. The other firm-specific control variables have 
little influence on the timing of last forecast updates. 
5.3 Robustness Check 
Several sensitivity tests are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the results to various 
conditions and alternate specifications of variable constructs. First, interactions terms are 
included in the models. Models 1a and 1b are tested inclusive of the interaction variables 
between the REGIME variable and with one of these firm-specific factors, namely earnings 
change sign (ECSIGN), earnings change magnitude (ECHANGE), and cross-listing status 
(XLIST). All the interaction variables are reported as insignificant and the results obtained 
from these extended models do not reveal any significant differences to the main findings 
previously reported. 
Second, prior research has shown that earnings volatility may adversely influence forecasting 
behaviour. We therefore test two alternative measures of earnings volatility in separate 
estimations of all models: EVOL (earnings per share volatility over the prior five financial 
years) and ROAVOL (return on assets volatility over the prior five financial years). Neither 
the EVOL nor ROAVOL coefficients are significant. Other results are not significantly 
different from the main findings except for the earnings change ECHANGE coefficient losing 
its significance. Correlation tests show that ECHANGE is highly correlated with EVOL and 
                                                 
46 Gaynor (2003) provides three general reasons why companies may be slow in providing earnings forecast 
updates in New Zealand: (1) directors are reluctant to provide bad news in the hope of a positive turnaround; (2) 
earnings forecast updates can be delayed until approval is obtained at the next monthly board meeting; and (3) 
many companies find forecasting difficult outside the six-month reporting cycle. 
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 ROAVOL which may explain the reduced significance. These results are also consistent with 
Baginski et al.'s (2002) assumption that the magnitude in earnings change acts as a proxy for 
the earnings volatility. 
Third, the models are tested inclusive of industry dummy variables for the six major industry 
categories: (1) materials/mining/energy, (2) technology/telecommunication/biotechnology, (3) 
financial services, (4) utilities/airports/airlines/ports/shipping, (5) manufacturing/healthcare, 
and (6) consumer staples. The results are mixed. Firms in the financial services industry tend 
to release fewer forecasts, which is consistent with findings in other jurisdictions; whereas 
firms in manufacturing and healthcare tend to issue more earnings forecasts. However, none 
of the industry dummy variables are significant in any regressions testing forecast precision, 
forecast error, or forecast horizon.  
Fourth, as statutory sanction came into effect on 1 December 2002 some firms may have 
either responded earlier or postponed their responses depending on the closeness of this date 
to their balance dates. To test whether our results are influenced by such behaviour, we retest 
the FCAST1, FCAST2, PRECISE1, ERROR, and FHORIZON models after dropping firm-
periods that fall within six months of the effective date of the statutory sanctions (i.e. 
approximately 12 months around 1 December 2002). However, our results are quantitatively 
similar to those previously reported for the full sample of observations.  
Fifth, in the ERROR model, only range and point earnings forecasts are used to measure 
ERROR. As a consequence, we restrict our sample and ignore the materiality of the forecast 
error. To address these constraints, we construct another dependent variable ACCURACY 
which takes the value of one if the forecast is proved ex post to be accurate and zero 
otherwise. A 10 percent materiality level is applied for range and point forecasts. This 
measure therefore allows us to evaluate the materiality of forecast error for all precision 
levels. In contrast to the previous findings for the ERROR model, the results from estimating 
the ACCURACY model do not reveal any significant improvement in the overall forecast 
accuracy in the post-sanctions period. The imposition of a materiality threshold for the 
quantitative forecasts is likely to have contributed to these contrary findings. 
Sixth, we re-estimate the three PRECISE1, ERROR, and FHORIZON models after excluding 
neutral news earnings forecasts. As a result, we remove the independent BAD and GOOD 
variables and replace them with a new variable ENEWS which is coded zero and one for bad 
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 and good news earnings forecasts, respectively. The results from these three models are 
similar to those reported in the original models. 
Lastly, we re-estimate all models inclusive of an additional variable ANALYST which 
measures the number of analysts following the firm during the financial year47. The 
coefficients on the ANALYST variable are insignificant for all models. The results for the 
remaining variables remain unchanged. 
Overall, the sensitivity analyses show that the main findings are robust to various alternative 
conditions and specifications except for forecast accuracy. In particular, the results on the 
REGIME variable continue to be significant. 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this study has been to examine the impact of a statutory-backed continuous 
disclosure regime in New Zealand. Consistent with the intention of the corporate regulators, 
we expect that statutory sanctions would increase the costs for non-compliance leading to a 
positive impact on disclosure behaviour. Using management earnings forecasts as our proxy 
for measuring the change in disclosure behaviour, we hypothesise that the quantity 
(frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) of earnings forecasts 
would improve following the introduction of statutory sanctions. Collectively, our findings 
provide qualified support for the hypothesised effects of the statutory sanctions. The 
frequency (overall and non-routine) and the quality (precision and accuracy) of earnings 
forecasts have significantly improved. However, a large number of financial periods with 
material changes in earnings are either not pre-empted by an earnings forecast or are only 
made in conjunction with routine events, and many earnings forecasts are still qualitative in 
nature. Furthermore, the improvement achieved for forecast precision and accuracy has been 
accompanied by a decline in forecast horizon. 
Based on a three and a half year period after the introduction of the statutory sanctions and 
restricted to an examination of management earnings forecasts, our findings provide only 
limited evidence a culture of continuous disclosure where the market is continuously updated 
with material information as soon as it arises as expected by the New Zealand corporate 
regulators. Nonetheless, the observed positive change in quantity and quality of earnings 
forecasts is superior to that observed in Australia after the introduction of statutory sanctions 
                                                 
47 Approximately 55.38 percent of sample firm years have an analyst following. 
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 in 1994. These findings have important implications for corporate regulators in their quest for 
a superior disclosure regime. Importantly, strong enforcement action may not necessarily be a 
precondition for achieving a change in corporate disclosure behaviour as argued in prior 
research. 
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 Table 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Selecting criteria Number of observations 
Sample Firms  
Total number of firms listed on NZX as on 3 December 2004 197 
Less firms listed on NZX as on 3 December 2004 without IRG data (44) 
Less firms not surviving at least for the period 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004 (59) 
Total firms in final sample 94 
 Sample NZX Firm Years and documents lodged  
Total firm years by 94 firms 655* 
Less firm years with missing documents or unusable earnings data for the firms (23) 
Total firm years in the final sample 632** 
Total documents (with potential management earnings forecasts) examined in the final sample 2677 
Less documents not containing management earnings forecasts (1957) 
Final sample of documents containing management earnings forecasts 720 
* Total firm years including all firm years with ending balance date from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. 
 
** Among 632 firm years (342 pre- and 290 post-statutory sanctions), there are 350 firm years (163 pre- and 187 post-statutory 
sanctions) which include at least one management earnings forecast.  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Earnings Forecasts Classified by Negative and Positive Earnings Change Partitions   
Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
   All Firm Years  Pre-Statutory 
Sanctions Period 
 Post-Statutory 
Sanctions Period 
 Earnings 
Change 
No. of 
Firm 
Years 
No. (%) of Firm 
Years Pre-empted 
by an Earnings 
Forecast 
No. of 
Firm 
Years 
No. (%) of Firm 
Years Pre-empted 
by an Earnings 
Forecast 
No. of 
Firm 
Years 
No. (%) of Firm 
Years Pre-empted 
by an Earnings 
Forecast 
Negative =<-0.1 68 34 (50.00%) 35 16 (45.71%) 33 18 (54.55%) 
 -0.1 to –0.05 42 21 (50.00%) 26 12 (46.15%) 16 9 (56.25%) 
 -0.05 to –0.01 84 47 (55.95%) 50 24 (48.00%) 34 23 (67.65%) 
 -0.01 to 0 57 30 (52.63%) 24 9 (37.50%) 33 21 (63.64%) 
Positive 0 to 0.01 79 39 (49.37%) 40 16 (40.00%) 39 23 (58.97%) 
 0.01 to 0.05 146 92 (63.01%) 76 41 (53.95%) 70 51 (72.86%) 
 0.05 to 0.1 53 33 (62.26%) 36 18 (50.00%) 17 15 (88.24%) 
 >=0.1 103 54 (52.43%) 55 27 (49.09%) 48 27 (56.25%) 
N  632 350 (55.38%) 342 163 (47.66%) 290 187 (64.48%) 
N is the number of total firm years with balance date ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005 for 94 firms (655 less 23 missing 
observations). A management earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current period earnings change. A 
firm year is classified as a pre-statutory sanctions (post-statutory sanctions) firm year if its financial reporting period ends before (on or 
after) 1 December 2002. Earnings Change is the change in yearly earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the current 
financial year. 
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 Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
 Overall Sample Pre Statutory 
Sanctions Period 
Post Statutory 
Sanctions Period 
t-stat (Mann Whitney 
z-value)/chi-square 
Variables Mean 
(Median)/Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Mean 
(Median)/Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Mean 
(Median)/Frequency 
(Percentage) 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all firm years 
 N = 632 N = 342 N = 290  
|Earnings Change| 0.177 (0.037) 0.209 (0.040) 0.139 (0.031) -1.643^ (-1.183) 
Log of |Earnings Change| 
(ECHANGE) 
-3.323 (-3.306) -3.239 (-3.214) -3.422 (-3.474) -1.351^ (-1.177) 
Total Assets (millions) 3,118.1 (200.8) 3,202.1 (170.3) 3,019.0 (229.5) -0.133 (1.141) 
Log of Total Assets (SIZE)  19.038 (19.118) 18.977 (18.953) 19.109 (19.252) 0.755 (1.145) 
Log of market to book ratio 
(MVBV) 
0.376 (0.259) 0.290 (0.164) 0.477 (0.356) 2.947** (3.057**) 
Management Earnings Forecast 
(FCAST1) 
350 (55.38%) 163 (47.66%) 187 (64.48%) 17.971** 
Non-routine Management 
Earnings Forecast (FCAST2) 
103 (16.30%) 29 (8.48%) 74 (25.52%) 35.356** 
ECSIGN 381 (60.29%) 207 (60.53%) 174 (60.00%) 0.018 
XLIST 162 (25.63%) 85 (24.85%) 77 (26.55%) 0.237 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for all management earnings forecasts 
 N = 720 N = 301 N = 419  
NREVENT (non-routine) 141 (19.58%) 42 (13.95%) 99 (23.63%) 10.410** 
PRECISE1 (qualitative)  401 (55.69%) 211 (70.10%) 190 (45.35%) 48.864** 
PRECISE1 (open-ended) 71 (9.86%) 24 (7.97%) 47 (11.22%)  
PRECISE1 (range) 68 (9.44%) 11 (3.65%) 57 (13.60%)  
PRECISE1 (point) 180 (25.00%) 55 (18.27%) 125 (29.83%)  
BAD (bad news) 129 (17.92%) 51 (16.94%) 78 (18.62%) 0.333 
GOOD (good news) 451 (62.64%) 197 (65.45%) 254 (60.62%) 1.745 
FHORIZON 190 (189) 200 (212) 183.3 (171) -2.360** (-1.650) 
FHORIZON (350 last management 
earnings forecasts) 
135 (128) 153 (132) 120 (126) -3.580** (-3.007**) 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all last range and point management earnings forecasts 
 N = 131 N = 43 N = 88  
Error 0.083 (0.003) 0.219 (0.010) 0.017 (0.003) -1.030 (-3.659**) 
ERROR -5.628 (-5.687) -4.708 (-4.653) -6.077 (-5.884) -3.392** (-3.659**) 
PRECISE2 (point) 95 (72.52%) 35 (81.40%) 60 (68.18%) 2.531 
BAD (bad news) 42 (32.06%) 10 (23.26%) 32 (36.36%) 2.279 
GOOD (good news) 57 (43.51%) 19 (44.19%) 38 (43.18%) 0.012 
FHORIZON 100 (107) 124 (124) 89 (75) -2.317* (-1.924^) 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). The pre-statutory sanctions 
period includes all financial years ending in the 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002 period and the post-statutory sanctions period 
includes all those ending in the 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005 period. |Earnings Change| is the absolute value of percentage 
change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the 
absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. Total Assets is 
the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the current 
financial reporting period. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of 
the current financial reporting period. Error is the magnitude of forecast error measured by the difference of forecasted and actual 
earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. ERROR is the natural logarithm of the magnitude of 
forecast error measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the 
financial year. FCAST1 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s change in earnings is pre-empted by 
at least one management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. FCAST2 is a variable taking the value 2, 1, and 0 if the current financial 
year’s change in earnings is pre-empted by at least a non-routine earnings forecast, at least a routine earnings forecast, and no earnings 
forecasts, respectively. ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 
0 otherwise. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. 
FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the 
corresponding financial year. FNUM is the number of earnings forecasts released per financial year. BAD is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. 
GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in 
current period earnings and 0 otherwise. PRECISE1 is level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, 
range, and point forecasts, respectively. PRECISE2 is an indicator variable taking the value of 0 and 1 for range and point forecasts, 
respectively. NREVENT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast is released through a non-
routine announcement and 0 otherwise. 
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 Table 4 
Factors Associated with Management Earnings Forecasts Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
FCAST1i,t = a0 + a1REGIMEi,t + a2ECSIGNi,t + a3ECHANGEi,t + a4SIZEi,t + a5XLISTi,t + a6MVBVi,t + (ui +εi,t) 
  All Firm Years Negative Earnings 
Change 
Positive Earnings 
Change 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept  -7.264 
(0.004**) 
-6.390 
(0.023*) 
-6.610 
(0.023*) 
REGIME + 
 
1.202 
(0.000**) 
1.254 
(0.001**) 
1.185 
(0.000**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
0.019 
(0.937)   
ECHANGE + 
 
0.143 
(0.044*) 
0.045 
(0.357) 
0.220 
(0.028*) 
SIZE + 
 
0.408 
(0.002**) 
0.342 
(0.011*) 
0.390 
(0.007**) 
XLIST - 
 
-0.964 
(0.067^) 
-0.865 
(0.114) 
-1.114 
(0.073^) 
MVBV + 
 
0.008 
(0.486) 
-0.026 
(0.466) 
0.131 
(0.334) 
lnsig2u  1.692 1.471 1.681 
sigma_u  2.330 2.086 2.318 
rho   0.623 0.570 0.620 
Likelihood ratio test  162.350** 30.700** 73.060** 
Model Chi-square  34.510** 12.740* 20.810** 
N  632 251 381 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is 
predicted (not predicted). Random effects logistic regression model is used where the dependent variable is FCAST1, an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s change in earnings is pre-empted by at least one 
management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial 
reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in 
the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the 
absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. 
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Table 5 
Factors Associated with Non-routine Management Earnings Forecasts Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
FCAST2i,t = b0 + b1REGIMEi,t + b2ECSIGNi,t + b3ECHANGEi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5XLISTi,t + b6MVBVi,t  + μi,t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Firm Years 
 
Negative Earnings 
Change 
Positive Earnings 
Change 
 
Variable 
Expected Sign Comparison Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
  
0/1 
 
3.372 
(0.000**) 
3.963 
(0.005**) 
2.772 
(0.018*) 
 
  
2/1 
 
-3.088 
(0.017*) 
-2.102 
(0.285) 
-3.932 
(0.023*) 
REGIME + 
 
0/1 
 
-0.396 
(0.015*) 
-0.523 
(0.037*) 
-0.319 
(0.085^) 
 
  
2/1 
 
1.095 
(0.000**) 
0.637 
(0.052^) 
1.481 
(0.000**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
0/1 
 
-0.280 
(0.123)   
 
  
2/1 
 
-0.244 
(0.319)   
ECHANGE + 
 
0/1 
 
-0.063 
(0.124) 
-0.023 
(0.394) 
-0.093 
(0.095^) 
 
  
2/1 
 
0.043 
(0.278) 
0.109 
(0.162) 
-0.009 
(0.465) 
SIZE + 
 
0/1 
 
-0.169 
(0.001**) 
-0.192 
(0.006**) 
-0.157 
(0.008**) 
 
  
2/1 
 
0.092 
(0.088^) 
0.070 
(0.248) 
0.097 
(0.147) 
XLIST - 
 
0/1 
 
0.412 
(0.041*) 
0.682 
(0.039*) 
0.237 
(0.217) 
 
  
2/1 
 
0.062 
(0.424) 
0.212 
(0.338) 
-0.055 
(0.450) 
MVBV + 
 
0/1 
 
-0.058 
(0.309) 
-0.098 
(0.292) 
-0.053 
(0.367) 
 
  
2/1 
 
0.129 
(0.212) 
-0.136 
(0.291) 
0.328 
(0.066^) 
Pseudo R2   0.050 0.042 0.062 
Model Chi-square   64.180** 21.690** 47.850** 
N   632 251 381 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Multinominal logit regression model is used where the dependent variable is FCAST2, an ordinal variable taking 
the value 2, 1, and 0 if the current financial year’s change in earnings is pre-empted by at least a non-routine earnings 
forecast, at least a routine earnings forecast, and no earnings forecasts, respectively. REGIME is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 
31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002).  
ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. 
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at 
the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial 
reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 
otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the 
current financial reporting period. 
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Table 6 
Factors Associated with Forecast Precision Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
PRECISE1i,t = c0 + c1REGIMEi,t + c2BADi,t + c3GOODi,t + c4ECHANGEi,t + c5SIZEi,t + c6XLISTi,t + c7MVBVi,t + 
c8NREVENTi,t + c9FHORIZONi,t + ηi,t 
  All Forecasts 
(including Neutral News) 
Bad News Good News 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
REGIME + 
 
0.697 
(0.000**) 
1.555 
(0.000**) 
0.630 
(0.003**) 
BAD ? 
 
-0.130 
(0.604)   
GOOD ? 
 
-1.011 
(0.000**)   
ECHANGE + 
 
-0.014 
(0.392) 
-0.030 
(0.395) 
0.049 
(0.233) 
SIZE - 
 
-0.129 
(0.018*) 
-0.363 
(0.005**) 
-0.092 
(0.126) 
XLIST + 
 
0.734 
(0.002**) 
0.722 
(0.198) 
0.835 
(0.008**) 
MVBV + 
 
0.387 
(0.001**) 
-0.270 
(0.363) 
0.479 
(0.002**) 
NREVENT + 
 
1.325 
(0.000**) 
1.623 
(0.000**) 
1.420 
(0.000**) 
FHORIZON - 
 
-0.003 
(0.001**) 
-0.001 
(0.322) 
-0.004 
(0.002**) 
Pseudo R2  0.116 0.137 0.120 
Model Chi-square  187.620** 45.040** 111.470** 
N  720 129 451 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Ordered logit regression model is used where the dependent variable is PRECISE1, a measure of forecast precision, 
coded as 0, 1, 2, 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. REGIME is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 
December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). BAD is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current 
period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast 
indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the 
absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. NREVENT is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement 
and 0 otherwise. FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the 
end date of the corresponding financial year. 
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Table 7 
Factors Associated with Forecast Error Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
ERRORi,t = d0 + d1REGIMEi,t + d2BADi,t + d3GOODi,t + d4ECHANGEi,t + d5SIZEi,t + d6XLISTi,t + d7MVBVi,t + d8PRECISE2i,t 
+d9FHORIZONi,t + γi,t 
  All Forecasts 
(including Neutral News) 
Bad News Good News 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
1.981 
(0.474) 
0.440 
(0.915) 
3.430 
(0.497) 
REGIME - 
 
-1.136 
(0.003**) 
-0.506 
(0.247) 
-1.099 
(0.055^) 
BAD ? 
 
-0.267 
(0.612)   
GOOD ? 
 
0.228 
(0.646)   
ECHANGE + 
 
0.319 
(0.002**) 
0.513 
(0.010**) 
0.549 
(0.002**) 
SIZE - 
 
-0.304 
(0.012*) 
-0.224 
(0.146) 
-0.331 
(0.097^) 
XLIST - 
 
0.767 
(0.123) 
0.370 
(0.667) 
0.896 
(0.254) 
MVBV ? 
 
0.244 
(0.361) 
0.612 
(0.262) 
0.166 
(0.689) 
PRECISE2 
 
+ 
 
-0.792 
(0.030*) 
-0.728 
(0.147) 
-0.932 
(0.087^) 
FHORIZON 
 
+ 
 
0.003 
(0.071^) 
0.002 
(0.293) 
0.004 
(0.154) 
Adjusted R2  0.194 0.106 0.189 
F-value  4.480** 1.690 2.860* 
N  131 42 57 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Linear regression models are used where the dependent variable ERROR is the natural logarithm of the magnitude of 
forecast error measured as the difference between the forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the 
beginning of the financial year. REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends 
in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions 
period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management 
earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 
otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share 
price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial 
reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 
otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current 
financial reporting period. PRECISE2 is an indicator variable taking the value of 0 and 1 for range and point forecasts, respectively. 
FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the 
corresponding financial year. 
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Table 8 
Factors Associated with Forecast Horizon Pre- and Post-Statutory Sanctions 
 
FHORIZONi,t = e0 + e1REGIMEi,t + e2BADi,t + e3GOODi,t + e4ECHANGEi,t + e5SIZEi,t + e6XLISTi,t + e7MVBVi,t + e8FNUMi,t + φi,t 
  All Forecasts 
(including Neutral News) 
Bad News Good News 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
  
319.410 
(0.000**) 
294.768 
(0.013*) 
373.887 
(0.000**) 
REGIME + 
 
-15.284 
(0.029*) 
-10.768 
(0.289) 
-16.626 
(0.064^) 
BAD ? 
 
-45.244 
(0.000**)   
GOOD ? 
 
-15.125 
(0.143)   
ECHANGE + 
 
-1.050 
(0.330) 
-4.476 
(0.234) 
-0.985 
(0.381) 
SIZE - 
 
-4.319 
(0.062^) 
-6.798 
(0.136) 
-7.295 
(0.028^) 
XLIST + 
 
18.949 
(0.110) 
9.238 
(0.713) 
34.094 
(0.041*) 
MVBV ? 
 
0.917 
(0.873) 
-14.283 
(0.353) 
3.839 
(0.614) 
FNUM 
 
- 
 
-40.344 
(0.000**) 
-31.142 
(0.000**) 
-49.166 
(0.000**) 
Adjusted R2  0.293 0.164 0.311 
F-value  19.090** 3.250** 16.700** 
N  350 70 210 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Linear regression models are used where the dependent variable is FHORIZON, the number of calendar days between the 
release date of the last management earnings forecast for the period and the end date of the corresponding financial year. REGIME is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 
December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 
2002). BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change 
in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast 
indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute 
value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. FNUM is the number of earnings forecasts released per 
financial year. 
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